Two issues have dominated the period since the last update: the escalation in skirmishes between the United States military and that of Iran on the one hand, and the declarations that an agreement has been reached between the United States and Iran on the other. However, the contours of the supposed agreement are unclear. Immediately after the two sides declared that they had come to terms, they offered completely contradictory descriptions of what was contained in the agreement. The reality of what was agreed to will become apparent on implementation. The agreement was supposed to be signed on 14 June, but at time of writing this has not yet happened.
Meanwhile, in Lebanon, the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, dubbed “the Ceasefire War” by an Israeli comedian, has escalated. Hezbollah increased its attacks into Israel and Israel responded by increasing airstrikes on Hezbollah positions, including two attacks on the Dakhya Quarter in southern Beirut, where Hezbollah’s main headquarters are located. Israel also ordered the re-evacuation of all cities, towns and villages of south Lebanon up to the Zaharani River so as to enable it to strike Hezbollah without harming civilians. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese civilians have once again moved north. Israeli ground forces also resumed their advance into Lebanese territory, capturing several dominating ridges from which fire was being conducted into Israel. After the first Israeli strike on Beirut (7 June), Iran fired more than 20 missiles at Israel, to which Israel responded with two waves of airstrikes on Iran. On 13 and 14 June, Hezbollah fired once again into Israeli territory, and Israel responded with further strikes in the Dakhya Quarter. Iran declared that it will fire at Israel again (though it has not yet done so at time of writing).
It is very unlikely that Hezbollah fired into Israel without Iranian involvement in the decision. This can accordingly be viewed as an Iranian attempt to challenge the American version of the agreement, which does not connect Lebanon to the situation in the Gulf. The question for Israel is this: If Iran fires at Israel, will the United States prevent Israel from retaliating against Iran or not?
Iran:
In theory, there is finally an agreement between the United States and Iran. However, whereas the United States describes the conditions of the agreement as meeting its demands (the removal of the approximately 450 kilograms of partially enriched uranium from Iran, the opening of free passage through the Hormuz Strait, and no reduction in sanctions on Iran or release of frozen Iranian assets until these are achieved), the Iranians describe an agreement that is completely opposite in every particular (Iran only delays, rather than ceases, the further enrichment of uranium; the Hormuz Strait is to be controlled by Iran and Oman, who are to receive payment for passage therein; frozen assets will be freed; and an international fund will be established to repair the damage inflicted on Iran during the war – in other words, the United States and the Arab oil states will pay to rebuild Iran).
Initially, the United States claimed the agreement would be signed by delegations from each country and began seeking a venue. The Iranians responded that they would not send a delegation and the signing ceremony would be conducted remotely by video conference.
Is there an actual agreement? If so, what are its terms? Will the signatories bother to implement it? The issue is still up in the air. Experience suggests that the Iranians will do all they can to obfuscate and cheat. They are playing for time, apparently assessing that President Trump’s repeated threats to attack without doing so signal that he is unwilling to renew the war and can therefore be “played”. This Iranian view was strengthened by Trump’s criticism of Israel for responding to attacks on its civilians with strikes on Hezbollah’s headquarters in Beirut.
Since the ceasefire began, the Iranians have attacked 16 to 19 merchant ships (the frequency of such incidents has gone down since the last report). Most of these ships were attacked while transiting the Hormuz Strait and a few while anchored near ports along the coast between the Strait at the southern edge of the Gulf and Kuwait at the northern edge. There have been multiple reports of attempts by combat boats of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to approach ships, but these ended without attacks as American warships approached the areas.
Meanwhile, the American Navy has turned back approximately 125 ships sailing to or from Iran. Most turned back immediately when ordered to do so, but a few tried to run the blockade. Of these, three to five were seized and six were hit by American ship guns or aircraft. Of the six ships hit by American fire, one or two were also seized (thus counted in both lists) and the others turned back.
The Iranians claim that a couple of hundred ships have sailed through the Strait on the Iranian side, with Iran’s permission and after their owners paid a passage tax to Iran. These are not ships from Iranian ports that the Americans are blocking. They are ships from ports on the Arab side of the Gulf whose owners prefer to pay rather than risk attack or delay. However, the true number is not clear, as the Iranians tend to invent numbers to suit their propaganda.
On 4 May, the American Navy sent ships to escort merchant ships crossing the Strait near the Emirati and Omani coasts. This precipitated a skirmish with the Iranians who fired on the merchant ships and probably also on the American ships. The Iranians also fired at civilian targets in Oman and the Emirates. The escort program was officially cancelled the following day, but seems to have been quietly renewed at some later date. It appears that about 100 merchant ships have since transited the Strait safely.
This greatly weakened Iran’s bargaining position, especially since the American blockade was continuing successfully. Since the official halting of the operation, there have been four or five incidents in which American naval vessels engaged Iranian forces attempting to enforce the closure of the Strait, so the operation is apparently continuing even if not in the manner of American ships sailing as direct escorts of merchant ships. During these incidents, several Iranian combat boats were sunk, a radar installation was destroyed, and one or two Iranian missile or exploding drone launch sites were hit. In at least one case, the Iranians attempted a direct attack on American ships but failed to hit them. They claim to have shot down an American drone. After each incident, the Iranians also fired missiles and exploding drones at Kuwait and the Arab Emirates. The Iranians claim that they target only the American bases in those countries, but they also fired at civilian targets, such as Kuwait’s international airport, and have inflicted civilian casualties (one dead; several wounded). Five American soldiers were wounded.
Over the past week, the Iranians renewed their attempts to intercept merchant ships. American warships shot down Iranian missiles and exploding drones and fired on Iranian speedboats. American aircraft retaliated by destroying relevant Iranian installations on islands and near the shore (radars, missile launchers, and exploding drone launchers). On 8 June, an American attack helicopter was shot down (the crew was rescued) in the Hormuz Strait. On the nights of 9-10 and 10-11 June, the Americans increased the number of strikes and apparently also bombed targets further inland. A third wave of strikes was planned for the night of 11-12 June but was cancelled by President Trump who declared that an agreement had been reached with Iran to be signed within a few days. Each night, Iran retaliated to the American strikes by firing surface-to-surface missiles and exploding drones at American bases in Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait.
The escalated American strikes came on the heels of two waves of Israeli airstrikes. On 7 June, Israel conducted an airstrike on a Hezbollah post in Beirut. Iran retaliated by firing three salvos of missiles at Israel (22-25 missiles; the exact number is unclear). They were intercepted by Israeli anti-missile batteries. No Israelis were hurt directly by the missiles, though a few were injured while rushing to shelters. Minor damage was caused to residential buildings by falling debris from intercepted missiles. One missile shard fell on a hangar housing utility vehicles (forklifts?) at an Israeli air force base. The first salvo was directed at northern Israel, the second at central Israel, and the third at southern Israel. The Iranians claim they were targeting Israeli air force bases, but even if some of their missiles were aimed at those bases, the others were undoubtedly aimed at civilian areas. The Yemenite Houthis joined in and fired two missiles towards “occupied Jaffa” (i.e., Tel Aviv). Both were intercepted, but the Houthis of course claim to have hit their targets “precisely”.
Israel retaliated with two waves of airstrikes, each involving a few dozen aircraft. The targets in the first strike were air defense installations (radars and anti-aircraft missile launchers) and surface-to-surface missile installations the Iranians had been repairing during the ceasefire. The second strike hit a petrochemical plant that was manufacturing ingredients for surface-to-surface missiles. (That was the cryptic way in which it was reported. The Israelis are probably referring to ingredients for the manufacture of solid fuel for missiles.) The second strike also hit the aerospace university of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Tehran and a drone manufacturing plant. According to Iran, two Iranian soldiers were killed and 15 wounded in the Israeli strikes.
Israel was ready to launch a third wave of strikes when President Trump demanded a cessation of the exchange. To quote Vice President J.D. Vance, American and Israeli interests had diverged. The United States preferred to achieve an agreement with no more fighting on the belief that it could achieve the fundamental goal of the war, the elimination of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, through diplomatic means. Iran agreed to cease missile fire, claiming it had achieved its goal of proving that it was defending Hezbollah and Lebanon from Israeli aggression. If, before the exchange, Iran had stated that any Israeli attacks on Hezbollah in Beirut would be met by an Iranian response, it now added that it would respond to Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon as well. Israel ignored the Iranian ultimatum, continued striking southern Lebanon (with no Iranian response), and stated that in the event of further Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel, it would, as it had before the current exchange, respond by attacking Beirut. And despite Vance’s statement, the United States itself conducted strikes inside Iran, as described above.
The Iranian government is working hard to strengthen its image vis-à-vis the Iranian population. In addition to initiating and funding demonstrations in support of the regime, it is selling its military successes in the war both by understating the damage and casualties it has suffered and by inflating the casualties and damage it has inflicted on the United States and Israel. In a television interview, a regime representative claimed that during the war the Iranians have killed more than 1,000 American soldiers and 2,000 Israelis, and that the numbers are so low because Iran held itself back. The true numbers, even including the killed of all the other countries targeted by the Iranians, are of course much lower: 13 Americans, 21 Israelis, and 74 from the Arab peninsula states, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and the Palestinian Authority. The Iranian government is airing programs on television explaining the use of rifles and has conducted weapons training at some of the pro-regime demonstrations.
Another front of the war is financial operations. The US Department of the Treasury has targeted Iranian international money transfers. The Iranians bypassed some of the sanctions by using cryptocurrency and through the assistance of Turkey and Pakistan. The United States has managed to confiscate a billion dollars’ worth of cryptocurrency.
Throughout the period, the Iranians have continued to sporadically fire missiles and exploding drones at Iranian Kurdish anti-regime forces based in Iraq.
Lebanon:
The United States hosted negotiations between Israel and Lebanon to achieve a political agreement. However, when a ceasefire between the two countries was declared, it was quickly proven empty, because the Lebanese government has no control over Hezbollah. The Lebanese government is, in fact, threatened by Hezbollah. (On 24 May, the General Secretary of Hezbollah stated outright that the negotiations were a betrayal and cause for rebellion against the government.) The Lebanese army is not able to fight Hezbollah, and parts of it are in fact Hezbollah proxies. The talks were for show and effectively irrelevant.
Fighting between Israel and Hezbollah has escalated since the last update. All together, since the beginning of the so-called ceasefire in mid-April, Hezbollah has conducted approximately 1,000 attacks, of which about a quarter were into Israel and the rest at Israeli troops in south Lebanon. In most attacks, more than one munition was fired, so there have in fact been thousands of exploding drones of various sizes (approximately 55% of all attacks), rockets and mortar bombs (approximately 33% of all attacks), and anti-tank missiles fired by Hezbollah as well as many bombs placed in houses and roadsides. Exploding drones are the cause of most of the Israeli casualties. Since the beginning of the ceasefire in mid-April, 12 more Israeli soldiers have been killed since the last update and 68 wounded (46 since the last update), and another Israeli soldier was killed in an accident. Four Israeli civilians have been wounded. As of 31 May, Hezbollah increased the distance into Israel it was firing rockets, reaching the towns of Acre, Karmiel, Safad and Tiberias – a depth of 17 to 30 kilometers inside Israel.
Hezbollah’s anti-aircraft defenses are weak, but they have made more than 30 attempts to shoot down Israeli aircraft. So far they have managed to shoot down one medium-sized drone, perhaps two.
Israel has responded by ordering the population of south Lebanon to evacuate, at first from villages near the Israeli front line but gradually encompassing the entire area up to the Zaharani River. So far, this excludes the city of Sidon but includes the towns of Tyre and Nabatiya and many dozens of villages in an area originally populated by several hundred thousand people.
As the population left, the Israelis escalated their airstrikes, using combat aircraft to bomb detected Hezbollah positions and armed drones to strike individual Hezbollah personnel sighted in the open, as well as rocket launchers and other weapons. Approximately 3,500 targets were hit in total. In many cases, because the IDF waited for the civilians to evacuate, only materiel was hit, as Hezbollah personnel exploited the warnings to civilians to evacuate too. However, once the evacuations became permanent and Hezbollah wanted to continue fighting, it found itself without civilian cover. The attacks on individual Hezbollah personnel have focused on commanders. Over the past month, the divisional commander of Hezbollah’s Nasser division (they have three static regional divisions in south Lebanon) and his deputy were both killed, as well as the deputy’s replacement a few days later. At least half a dozen brigade and battalion commanders have also been killed.
Israel initially responded to the attacks on its civilians solely through attacks in south Lebanon during which it hunted the rocket launchers. But on 7 June, it conducted an attack on a small Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut, killing several mid-level personnel and wounding more. This attack was Iran’s excuse to fire missiles at Israel.
Towards the end of May, Israeli troops gradually began advancing deeper into Lebanon to capture all remaining hill crests in eastern south Lebanon from which there is a direct line of sight to northern Israeli villages. At time of writing, about 600 square kilometers of south Lebanon are held by Israel. Behind the front line, Israeli troops scour the land in pursuit of Hezbollah weapons caches, tunnels, command posts, and so on. These are scattered both inside and underneath residential and public buildings, as well as at many sites hidden in forests and scrub between built-up areas.
In an attempt to halt the Israeli advance, Hezbollah apparently attempted to breach the Qaroun Dam to release its water into the Litani River ravine. Israeli aircraft attacked the Hezbollah team working on this project, halting it.
Since the beginning of the ceasefire, the Israelis have killed at least 900 Hezbollah personnel (700 since the last update) and wounded many hundreds more (there is no information on how many exactly). The majority were killed by air and drone strikes, though a portion were also killed during close-range ground combat with Israeli infantry and tanks. There are reports in the Lebanese media that the accumulating casualties are causing a morale crisis in Hezbollah. Since they joined the war against Israel on 8 October 2023 (a day after the Hamas offensive), they have lost at least 6,000 killed, perhaps as many as 6,500, and at least that many wounded (one report claimed the wounded are double the number of killed). These numbers mean that at least 20%, perhaps as many as 33%, of Hezbollah’s prewar manpower have become casualties (though probably many of the wounded have recovered). One report states that this has caused incidents of refusal by lower ranks to obey orders considered too risky and an attempt to mobilize teenagers from Hezbollah’s youth movement to replace casualties and insubordinate troops.
Many feel the leadership is operating to serve Iran’s interests, not the interests of local Lebanese Shiites. The repeated evacuations of civilians from their homes, many of whom will have no home to return to as the Israelis are destroying every building in which Hezbollah has stored weapons or from which it fights, is also causing a gradual loss of support among the Shiite population. However, these reports should be regarded with caution, as it is difficult to check the credibility of the sources.
On 6 June, the IDF destroyed a vehicle moving near Hezbollah positions in an area whose civilians had been evacuated. The vehicle was driving in the direction of Israeli troops positioned further along the road. However, the occupants were not Hezbollah, but a Lebanese Army brigadier-general, a captain and a soldier. It is not clear what they were doing in that area given that it was a combat zone between Israel and Hezbollah; nor is it known why were they moving towards the Israeli forces without prior coordination via the military liaison committee.
Hezbollah has also targeted some Christian villages in south Lebanon, as well as UNIFIL positions.The Lebanese government reported that approximately 3,666 people have been killed and approximately 11,321 wounded during the fighting from 2 March 2026 till the ceasefire. However, it did not provide separate numbers for military and civilian casualties. According to Israel, more than 2,600 (perhaps as many as 3,100) of the killed are Hezbollah personnel. In addition to Hezbollah fatalities, the killed include several dozen each from the Lebanese army, Amal militia, Palestinian militias, and an Iranian proxy militia.
Yemen:
During the exchange between Iran and Israel on 7-8 June, the Houthis fired two surface-to-surface missiles that were intercepted. They also declared that they were reimposing the blockade on Israeli ships sailing through the Bab al-Mandeb Straits.
On 9 June, after the Iranian-Israeli exchange ended, the Houthis launched an exploding drone that was shot down before reaching Israeli territory.
At time of writing, Israel has not responded.
Gaza:
The situation in Gaza has not changed. There too, the ceasefire is on paper only. There are daily skirmishes along the Yellow Line between Israeli forces manning the line and Hamas and other organizations attempting to attack their positions or infiltrate the line.
In response, in addition to defensive actions, Israel is gradually ramping up pressure on Hamas. Occasionally, Israel conducts airstrikes inside the Hamas-controlled area on specific commanders or combat teams of Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In a series of strikes beginning on 16 May, the Israelis killed the supreme military commander of Hamas in Gaza (the third killed by Israel since 7 October) and then, 10 days later, killed his replacement. With the death of the latter, Israel has killed all the senior political, administrative and military leaders of Hamas who were in office on 7 October. Since the last update, they have also killed a number of other Hamas commanders, including a brigade commander and various senior staff officers. They have also killed several senior commanders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Anti-Hamas Palestinian groups have conducted raids against Hamas personnel leading to skirmishes with casualties on both sides. Hamas claims these groups received support from the Israeli military.
The Israelis are gradually pushing the Yellow Line further into Hamas-controlled territory. After their withdrawal to the Yellow Line, the Israelis held about 56% of Gaza, but over the past month they have gradually increased that to approximately 60%. Behind the Yellow Line they continue to discover and destroy tunnels and above-ground weapons storage sites.
Israel:
Two terrorist attacks were conducted by Israeli Arabs.
In the Galilee, an Israeli Arab armed with a knife attacked a policeman. The attack failed and the perpetrator was captured.
In central Israel, an Israeli Arab conducted a series of shooting attacks with an improvised submachine gun at the entrance to three Israeli villages. One Israeli guard was killed and another wounded. At the third village, the attacker attempted to enter but was driven off by a guard returning fire. Meanwhile, police and military arrived, chased the attacker and killed him. Two suspected assistants of the attacker were captured.
Attacks such as these by Israeli Arabs are extremely rare.
Judea and Samaria:
Israel’s escalated operations against terrorist attacks continue to drastically reduce the number of such attacks committed by Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. The average over the past few months was approximately 310-350 attacks per month, of which 60-80 were with weapons (improvised bombs, knives, petrol bombs, firearms, cars for ramming attacks, and other implements) and approximately 230-280 were stone-throwing incidents. Average Israeli casualties per month are 8-10 wounded. The last fatality was in March in a car-ramming attack.
Israeli security forces have reported an increase in the number of attacks by Israeli civilians on Palestinians or (in most cases) on Palestinian property. The total numbers have reached proportions similar to those of the Palestinians, though with many fewer incidents in which weapons are used or people are directly attacked. Furthermore, in some of the incidents it is not clear who started the fighting. Thus, for example, in one case, Palestinians stole sheep and were chased by the Israeli shepherd, who called his friends for assistance. Israeli security forces are called in each case to separate the sides. A number of Israelis have been arrested for involvement in these incidents. In at least two cases, the Israelis involved also attacked the Israeli soldiers and police with stones.
Turkey:
President Erdoğan and other senior Turkish leaders have continued and perhaps even escalated their verbal attacks on Israel, hinting that sooner or later, Turkey will resort to military force against it. Given Turkey’s economic situation, most analysts think this is mostly political grandstanding for Erdoğan’s religious supporters. However, Turkey’s deep involvement with the new regime in Syria could create problematic situations if Israel has to operate against that regime. It has already had to do so several times over the past 18 months, both to push back radical Islamists trying to attack Israel from Syrian territory and to protect the Druze minority when they were attacked by the regime.
WHAT NEXT?
The main questions are: Is there an agreement between the US and Iran? What are its actual terms? And will it be implemented? Is this really a more powerful agreement, or merely a repeat of the useless Obama agreement under a new name?
Another question is the success or failure of Iran’s attempt to tie Israel’s hands against Hezbollah by making its agreement with the United States contingent on Israel’s stopping its operations against that organization. If Iran succeeds in this, Hezbollah will be able to recover after the defeats and heavy casualties it has suffered. The Americans’ attempts to mediate an agreement between Israel and Lebanon have no true bearing because the Lebanese government has no control over Hezbollah, so any agreement it signs is irrelevant; an agreement can serve solely to limit Israel’s ability to defend itself without having any effect on Hezbollah.
It is very unlikely that Hezbollah renewed its fire into Israel without Iran’s having been involved in the decision. Indeed, it may even have ordered it. Israel’s response in Beirut was something the Iranians wanted to happen so they could test Israel’s resolve and, even more so, the Americans’ resolve. Iran has declared that it will fire missiles into Israel (to quote: “tonight the skies over the Jews will rain missiles”).
Will President Trump demand that Israel refrain from reacting to Iranian attacks on it, as President Biden did in the past? Trump has already criticized Israel for responding to Hezbollah’s attacks on its territory by striking Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut. In so doing, he essentially signaled to Hezbollah that it has a safe haven and is immune to attack.
Trump is also signaling to the Iranians that he is desperate to achieve a deal, good or bad, at any cost. They are sure to attempt to capitalize on this.
DA. BESA 16 Giugno 2025