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Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look. 5  

Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look. 5

 

 

European Regional Subcultures

 

Earlier in this paper (Figures 1-4), I presented evidence of some regional clustering of 12 EU countries concerning the frequency of antisemitic prejudice in society, as well as the general and Jewish perceptions about the intensity of that prejudice. In light of the discussion in the previous pages, the question arises whether the detailed typology and configuration of antisemitism perceptions among Jews, too, displays regional variations. This may well be expected due to the significant social, cultural, and political differences that prevail across the continent.

The SSA theoretical and technical procedure mainly followed in this paper allowed us to illustrate structural features regarding each of the topics examined, as generated by variation in the frequencies of the various possible response options to the same questions posed in the different countries. A symmetric approach consists of reversing the observation angle, by representing inter-country structural differences, as generated by variation in the response to questions concerning each separate topic. Keeping in mind a conventional cross-tabulation, such as the one displayed in Table 2 above, we see that the maps displayed thus far configured the variation within each topic (the row categories) as modulated by the countries (the column categories). It is also possible to represent the variation of column categories (the countries) as modulated by the rows (the topic categories). In other words, each of the 17 topical maps displayed in the preceding sections of this paper matches with one equivalent map showing the overall structural configuration of inter-country variation. For the sake of space economy, I shall not review the full array of country configurations, variable-by-variable, but only focus on three principal models that emerged from this study.

Figure 23 exemplifies a circular-radial configuration – the most frequently found in this investigation. The data are the same as those represented in Figure 22, i.e., the most comprehensive simultaneous processing of 52 different categories examined here. Figure 22, it will be recalled, represented the whole combined cognitive and experiential perceptions of contents of antisemitism, transmission channels, national social issues, feared sanction, discrimination suffered, and perpetrators. The whole perceptional space in Figure 23 can be partitioned into four main regional domains: Francophone countries (France and Belgium), Mediterranean countries (Italy and Spain), Northwestern countries (UK, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, and Germany), and – stretching geopolitics a little – what I have defined as the Visegrad group of countries named after the castle north of Budapest (Hungary, Poland, and Austria) (Barna and Félix 2017). Austria is not actually part of the Visegrad group, but its government’s recent politics were very similar to those of the countries adhering to the group. In Figure 23, Austria actually also appears close to the northwestern countries (as already found in Figure 4 above), but the typology chosen here seems better to reflect current European political realities.

Distinctive regional patterns within the entire EU reveal different frequencies of the various aspects of antisemitism covered here, as well as regional differences in multiple reporting to multiple option questions. Very similar circular radial configurations obtain when one processes the data for main social issues of concern and channels of antisemitism transmission separately for the cognitive and for the experiential side, and perpetrators. In some cases, Germany converges with France and Belgium to form a Western domain, versus a Northern domain including the other countries contained in the Northwestern domain in Figure 23. Notably, the Netherlands is very consistently part of the Northern group and diverges from Belgium, which usually strongly correlates with France. France and Belgium possess some of the strongest perceptions of antisemitism, along with higher proportions of Muslims among the total population, either first-generation immigrants or second-generation local-born younger adults. Germany, too, hosts a high proportion of Muslim immigrants and children of immigrants. There is a difference, however: in the Francophone countries, most of these immigrants originate from North African former French colonies and protectorates, including many who are multi-generation veterans. In Germany, most Muslims originate from Turkey, and they are apparently better, or at least more quietly, integrated than the North Africans in France. Germany also accepted a large inflow of Syrian refugees following the humanitarian crisis in the wake of the civil war there during the 2010s. Northern or northwestern European countries usually display somewhat lower levels of perceived antisemitism combined with moderate albeit growing shares of recent immigrants. Mediterranean coastal countries in recent years have been exposed to largely visible inflows of refugees sailing from North African coastal locations though originally mostly from African countries south of Sahara. The Visegrad group of countries in recent years featured very explicit nationalistic political discourse and policies and extremely restrictive immigration policies.

 

Figure 23. SSA of country configuration of multiple variable combined perceptions of antisemitism, modulated by categories shown in Figure 22.

Key to countries: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; ES: Spain; FR: France; HU: Hungary; IT: Italy; NE: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; SE: Sweden; UK: United Kingdom.

 

One further factor at work in generating country differentiation may have been the policies adopted by national governments regarding the State of Israel. Despite notable contradictions and fluctuations over time in those country policies, and despite a considerably divided domestic opinion, it is plausible that the Jewish public is sensitive to them when integrating the different possible factors within one overall perception of antisemitism. All these reasons may have combined in determining distinct Jewish perceptional patterns in the different regions of Europe.

A second and different model of regional variation in Jewish perceptions of antisemitism is reported in Figure 24, which is based on the same data as in Figure 18 above.

Figure 24. SSA of country configuration of combined perceptions of antisemitism contents and transmission channels, modulated by categories shown in Figure 18.

Key to countries: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; ES: Spain; FR: France; HU: Hungary; IT: Italy; NE: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; SE: Sweden; UK: United Kingdom.

 

The data reflect the combined perceptions of antisemitism contents and transmission channels based on 31 categories. The configuration appearing here is axial, or characterized by parallel bands, which implies an ordinal logic in the observed regional domains. Such ordering in Figure 24 runs from the Francophone domain through the Northwestern, the Mediterranean, and the Visegrad countries. Here again, it is possible to detect a somewhat higher concern about antisemitism among people living in the two extreme country domains, but a much friendlier declared attitude toward Israel – regardless of actual policies – among the Visegrad group of countries. Similar axial configurations obtain for perceived discrimination, antisemitic statements heard, and multiple reporting. One hypothesis to explain the ordinal pattern may be that it conforms with the gradient from higher to lower percentages of Muslims among a given country’s total population.

A third regional model of country variation reported in Figure 25 relates to the perceptions of feared sanction concerning circumcision and animal ritual slaughtering (two categories and their possible overlap). The data are the same as those reported above in Figure 13. The possible interpretation is likely to shed additional light on the preceding configurations as well. Figure 25 suggests a simple bi-partition between countries that are predominantly Catholic and countries that are predominantly Protestant, with the exception of Austria, which here appears to be out of context. In fact, the main opposition to Jewish rituals has been expressed in predominantly Protestant societies, and in some cases, sanction has been effectively implemented.

Figure 25. SSA of country configuration of perceptions of feared sanction against Jewish rituals, modulated by categories shown in Figure 13.

Key to countries: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; ES: Spain; FR: France; HU: Hungary; IT: Italy; NE: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; SE: Sweden; UK: United Kingdom.

 

Summing up, the materials just reviewed suggest caution when addressing antisemitism as a global or continental phenomenology. Regional variation patterns imply the significant involvement of territorially diverse perceptions among resident Jews. Patterns of variation apparently derive from long term religious, cultural, and sociopolitical differences between countries or even cutting across countries – as may be the case in Belgium, Spain, Italy, or the UK. Another determinant may be more recent events such as the quantity of non-European immigration into Europe and the percentage of foreigners, especially Muslims, among the total population. Finer regional distinctions, country-by country, and by regions within countries, are a matter for further data processing and analysis.

 

Sergio Della Pergola, demografo

(continua)

 

(da  Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural LookAnalysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism. Berlin: De Gruyter, and Jerusalem: SICSA, ACTA, 40, 2, 2020)