Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look. 4
The Ingredients of Antisemitism
In this section I shall introduce, one by one, the main variables or ingredients that form a large share of the whole perception of the contemporary antisemitic phenomenology – at least as observed in 2018 in 12 countries of the European Union. In the first place, I shall aim at revealing the internal structure and meaning of each aspect separately. In a later section, I shall analyze the interactions that exist between different variables in order to obtain a better, multiple variable picture of how Jews in Europe perceive the explicit and latent logic and mode of operating of contemporary antisemitism. The technique followed here is Similarity Structure Analysis – SSA, as illustrated in the methodology section above.
Social and political issues
Initially, in order to demonstrate the method of analysis followed, I shall address the perception of antisemitism in the broader context of problematic societal issues in the 12 EU countries included in the 2018 FRA survey. Respondents were asked to assess their concern about a selection of social and political issues in the respective countries. The question [B02] was: To what extent do you think the following items are a problem in your country? The issues listed included unemployment, crime levels, immigration, antisemitism, racism, intolerance towards Muslims, and government corruption. This exploration of cognitive perceptions aimed at placing antisemitism in a broader context, namely, to what extent Jews perceive antisemitism as a predominant and central concern or rather than one among many other social issues in their country today.
Figure 6 reports the emerging SSA configuration based on seven categories. As already noted, this is the graphic equivalent of Table 2 above. Figure 6 graphically demonstrates the internal configuration of the main variable (main societal issues), reflecting the underlying statistical correlations between its various categories. The display provides a basis for a more complex understanding of the inherent meaning of that variable, which, in turn, may produce useful insights for more complex theoretical elaboration. The several categories listed in the original table are scattered on the map in a way that suggests the existence of broader underlying conceptual domains. Had more items been included in the original questionnaire, they either might have filled some of the empty spaces that appear within each of the main domains detected or might have generated additional principal domains.
Of the various items selected for evaluation, concern about antisemitism was the issue evoking the highest response (85% of respondents) followed by racism (84%). The issue drawing the lowest response was government corruption (38%). Quite significant variation emerged across countries regarding the different issue frequencies. In the SSA map, social and political issues judged as nationally significant display a circular-radial pattern with a clear central focus. Antisemitism and racism clearly figure at the core of Jewish public concerns. The analytic meaning of the display is that – not unexpectedly – perceptions of antisemitism and of racism are highly and mutually correlated and evidently constitute the societal issues of paramount Jewish concern. Fears of antisemitism and racism are correlated with other issues more strongly than each of the other issues is with all of the others on the list. Such worry is widely shared across the whole Jewish population spectrum. Jewish respondents perceive other concerns in more selective modes also reflecting their exposure to different national contexts, as well as different personal characteristics and sensitivities.
The other societal concerns are displayed as wedges around the central core and reveal interesting interrelationship patterns. Unemployment (67% of respondents) and crime level (70%) appear strongly clustered in a socioeconomic domain. European Jews do not perceive these issues as belonging to the same domain as immigration (65%), which in recent years constituted a high-profile theme in public political and socioeconomic discourse in many European countries. Intolerance toward Muslims (57%) following the recent arrival or generational coming of age of large minorities from North Africa and other Middle East and African countries is not perceived by Jews as part of the same immigration domain either. Finally, government corruption appears as a further separate concern domain.
Figure 6. SSA of perceptions of selected social and political issues, modulated by countries.
On the face of these data, perceptions of European Jews appear to be remarkably at odds with the main thread of political debates in most contemporary European societies. This may, perhaps, be interpreted as a symptom of many Jews’ persisting ability to preserve sober and independent judgement vis-à-vis the main social and political issues that animate national political discourses and decisions. It is also possible, however, that these data are a symptom of Jews’ estrangement and disenchantment from mainstream European politics. The strongly perceived centrality of concerns related mainly to the Jewish community itself and an evaluation of other main issues that differs from the majority of society may carry momentous consequences for continuing a relationship of mutual understanding between Jews and the majority of the population.
Contents of Antisemitism
Following the discussion sketched earlier in this paper, antisemitism can be conceptualized in many different ways. Several of the main possible contents were suggested to the respondents through questions that addressed both cognitive and experiential levels. One of the aims of the FRA survey was better to document the differing incidence of the phenomenon as something that cognitively “is in the air“ versus its actual manifestation in the experience of real people. A substantial gap of tens of percentage points separates opinions about the phenomenon from actual experiences of its occurrence. Here the aim is to ascertain whether the structure of Jewish perceptions is similar or different at the cognitive and experiential levels.
Cognitive Level
Reflecting accumulated knowledge from previous scientific research and general wisdom as discussed above in this paper, a broad catalogue of statements offensive to Jews was compiled. A selection of these statements was included in the 2018 FRA survey. One initial analysis here is devoted to where, when, and to what extent Jews in Europe perceive such statements as antisemitic. The question [B17] was: Would you consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she believes (items as listed)? Figure 7 reports the relevant SSA map based on six categories.
It is immediately apparent that the configuration in Figure 7 is different from the one displayed in Figure 6. Instead of a circular-radial shape (with or without a central focus), we have an axial-parallel shape. The analytic difference is that a circular shape has no beginning and no end, hence no hierarchy, whereas – if existing – a central spot may indicate the dominant or at least the main connective element among all others. An axial shape, on the other hand, displays an ordinal (if not hierarchic) progression of some underlying element or component, from one extreme end to an opposite end. In other words, the various elements under examination appear to be ordered according to an underlying logic.
Reading Figure 7 from the upper right corner to the bottom left corner, we find in succession a perception that it is antisemitic: to believe that Jews are not nationals in a given country’s context – 94% of respondents; that one would not marry a Jew – 59%; that one always notes who is Jewish among personal acquaintances – 55%. These perception categories can be collapsed into one comprehensive domain grounded in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, i.e., classic nineteenth and twentieth-century antisemitism. The opposite bottom-left corner hosts perceptions of antisemitism in the case when the State of Israel and its citizens are depicted as entities to be criticized and boycotted. If an explicit question about BDS (Boycott, Disinvest, Sanction) had been asked, that is where in all likelihood it would have been placed. The rationale behind the figure’s display seems to be historical chronology. Jewish foreignness is certainly the most ancient element, followed by a more modern elaboration about racist discrimination, while Israel, evidently, is the more recent development in global and Jewish history. As time goes by, Israel tends to become integrally incorporated within the Jewish perceptions of antisemitic notions and behaviors.
It is noteworthy in this respect that only 38% of European Jews believe that criticizing Israel is antisemitic, whereas 82% believe that boycotting Israel and Israelis is. The categories of opposition to Israel and of Jews possessing recognizable features (75% of respondents) are conceptually separated. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note the closeness of the respective categories. This demonstrates a Jewish perception of the existence of a diffused opinion that not only Jews but also Israelis possess distinctive and negative physical or character features. If this reading is accurate, it means that anti-Israel hostility pertains to a domain not necessarily or not exclusively related to contemporary political contingencies – normally the object of much debate and critique, including considerable disagreement within the Jewish camp. Emerging illegitimacy rather tends increasingly to reflect an alleged intrinsic property, hence becoming cognate to classic antisemitism.
Figure 7. SSA of perceptions as antisemitic of certain opinions or actions by non-Jews, modulated by countries.
Experiential Level
I turn now to a similar analysis of the perceptions of antisemitic contents as actually experienced by respondents. The question [B15a] was: In the last 12 months, have you ever personally heard or seen non-Jewish people in our country suggest that (Items as listed)? Multiple answers allowed. Figure 8, based on 8 categories, presents the pertinent SSA map.
Not unlike the previous map based on cognitive perceptions, experiential perceptions in the current map result in an axial display whose components can be synthetized in four or five domains. In the upper-right corner, we find judgments of Jews responding to attributes that conform to the tenets of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, such as dominance, foreignness and selfishness (Jews hold too much power – 43% of respondents; interests of Jews are different from the rest of population – 22%; Jews are not capable of integrating into the given country’s society – 11%). Another domain concerns judgment about the Shoah (The Holocaust is a myth or has been exaggerated – 24%; Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes – 35%). Next is a domain about self-culpability (Jews bring antisemitism on themselves – 32%). The final domain in the bottom-left corner concerns Israel (Israelis behave as Nazis toward the Palestinians – 51%; The world would be a better place without Israel – 33%).
As in the previous display, the ordering of the different parallel bands seems to reflect some historical chronology: from the older patterns of classic anti-Jewish prejudice, through the denial and minimization of Shoah, to the more recent delegitimization of the State of Israel. The formats of Figure 7, reflecting the cognitive perceptions, and Figure 8, reflecting the experiential perceptions, respond to the same underlying ordinal-hierarchical logic. Proximity of Jewish perceptions concerning the Holocaust and Israel is a significant finding to be kept in mind for further consideration.
Figure 8. SSA of selected antisemitic statements heard or seen by non-Jewish people, modulated by countries.
Combined levels
A joint display of the perceived contents of antisemitism (Figure 9) is significant in conjunction with the separate cognitive and experiential displays. Figure 9 presents the combined processing of the 14 categories displayed in Figure 7 and Figure 8. When mapping together data from two different variables, it may be expected that the domains subdivide and regroup either according to the perceptional mode (cognitive vs. experiential) or according to the inherent substantive contents of the questions involved.
On the one hand, it is notable how neatly distinct the cognitive and experiential perceptions appear horizontally divided on this map. The two perceptional domains tend to form separate “banks” of questions and issues. On the other hand, the substantive contents are clearly organized into three main domains: from right to left, Protocols-type, Holocaust, and Israel oriented – regardless of the cognitive or experiential nature of the category. It is remarkable how close Holocaust-related categories are perceived to be to the classic antisemitic concepts. Apparently, in the course of time and since the previous 2012 FRA survey, a certain evolution in the Jewish perceptions of hostile concepts and behaviors occurred. This entails a coalescence of Holocaust-related categories with old, classic antisemitism and of Israel-related categories within the overall antisemitism pattern. Indeed, we find one cognitive category apparently out of context: the one saying that Jews have recognizable features appears in the Holocaust domain. This seems to be another proof of the gradual coalescence of the various contents components of the overall antisemitic paradigm. Such perceptional changes may or may not have reflected actual changes within the general societies of European countries, but they are, nonetheless, real within the contemporary Jewish community perception.
I shall note, in conclusion, that because of a lamentable oversight by the principal investigators, the Christian theme of deicide was not included in the survey questionnaire and therefore it cannot be assessed empirically in this analysis. It can be hypothesized that it would occupy a spot close to the classic prejudice markers as displayed here.
Figure 9. SSA of combined cognitive and experiential perceptions of antisemitic expressions, modulated by countries.
Channels of Transmission
Antisemitism, in addition to involving a complex array of ideas, attitudes and behaviors, requires certain mechanisms of diffusion in order effectively to attain its goals. In the course of history such channels of transmission radically transformed under the impact of modernization and technological change.
Cognitive Level
I first examine respondents’ assessment at the cognitive level of how selected channels of antisemitism transmission, operating in the different countries, are perceived as problematic. The question [B04a] was: To what extent do you think the following are a problem in your country (items as listed)? The results appear in Figure 10, based on seven categories.
In the circular-radial display of the selected channels of transmission, we note four main domains. The first domain concerns those modes involving physical action and aggression. Items covered in the 2018 study included: in the street or other public places (mentioned by 73% of respondents); vandalism of Jewish buildings or institutions (66%); and desecration of Jewish cemeteries (63%). The central position of the cemeteries desecration item in the map is notable and testifies to the high sensitivity attributed to this particular mode of action by the Jewish public at large. Considering the physical and immediately documentable nature of this type of offense, it will be here defined as Practical antisemitism. A second domain includes expressions on the internet, including social media (89%, the most reported of all transmission channels), and mural graffiti (64%). Because of its immediate, spontaneous and defamatory character it will be here defined as Populist antisemitism. A third domain involves the Media other than the Internet, namely, the printed and electronic press (71%). Because of its thoughtful and researched character, it will be here defined as Narrative antisemitism. A fourth domain involves Political life (70%), where the contents are conveyed by a Political antisemitism mode of thought and action, also influenced by other public concerns and interests and conducted by actors involved in leadership struggles and currying favorable public opinion.
Figure 10. SSA of assessment of manifestations of antisemitism against Jewish community as a problem, modulated by countries.
Experiential level
At the experiential level, we are interested in assessing where and through which transmission channels Jews actually encountered antisemitic expressions, behaviors, or personal harassment. The question [B16a] was: In the last 12 months, where did you personally hear or see these comments (items as listed)? Multiple responses possible. The pertinent map, based on 11 categories, appears in Figure 11.
Figure 11. SSA of context of negative statements about Jews made by non-Jewish people, modulated by countries.
The patterns reported in Figure 11 reflect the specific tools and channels included in the survey questionnaire. At first sight, the map features many similarities with the previous one, with the exception of the Practical mode of antisemitism which was not included in the question asked here. As with the cognitive question reported above, the most frequent transmission channel of antisemitic messages was: on the internet, including social media (80% of respondents). This pertains to the Populist antisemitism domain along with: in a social situation (47%); in a public space (44%); and at sports events (11%) – stressing again the spontaneous and undisciplined character of such contexts. The more thoughtful, elaborated Narrative antisemitism domain primarily included: In academia (19%) and At cultural events (18%). The Political antisemitism domain included: at political events (48%) and in political speeches or discussions (40%). The category – in the Media other than internet and social media (56%) appears at the center of what might be a domain of its own along with a minor amount of response referring to undetermined channels (Somewhere else – 13%; Don’t know – 4%). On further consideration, the edited and censored character of the mainstream printed and electronic media suggests considering it as a cognate to the Narrative mode. Reading the map differently, however, one notes that the position of the Media category appears to be intermediate between the Narrative and Political domains, occupying exactly the same space that in the previous figure was defined Practical antisemitism. It is as if in the experiential perceptions of European Jews, the media played the same immediate and brutal role of cemetery profanation or other forms of vandalism.
Combined Levels
The results of a combined processing of the 17 categories on transmission channels of antisemitism already seen in Figure 10 (cognitive) and Figure 11 (experiential) are displayed in Figure 12. The question here might be again whether the predominant organizing principle of the pertinent categories is the mode of perception (cognitive versus experiential), or the substantive meaning of the category. The actual data in Figure 12 provide a revealing blend of the two modes.
The separation between cognitive and experiential domains is very clearly distinguishable, with only one exception not included within a coherent contiguous space: the experiential notion of Political event, which is included in the cognitive area of the map. This category, however, appropriately pertains to a Political antisemitism domain together with a cognitive category, political life, and another experiential category, political speech. In general, cognitive categories are spatially more compact and concentrated than experiential categories, meaning that Jewish perceptions are more coherent and shared regarding cognition than regarding experience.
Figure 12. SSA of combined cognitive and experiential perceptions of channels of transmission of antisemitism, modulated by countries.
The main partitions of channels of transmission, however – Practical, Populist, Narrative, and Political – appear clearly, and each of them includes categories pertaining to both cognitive and experiential modes. What appears here is a robust new typology of perceptions of antisemitism to be followed in the subsequent analysis. Remarkably, the two transmission channels that were investigated in both modes – the Internet including social media and the Media other than internet – appear coherently within the respective domains (Populist and Narrative antisemitism, respectively). The currently leading channel of transmission – the Internet – is perceived at the cognitive level as intriguingly proximate to the veteran and sometimes celebrated category of Graffiti. It may be inspiring, indeed, to perceive the little screen universally available nowadays as cognate to the old wall where one could freely trace expressive drawings and mottos. Finally, one notes that the transmission category Else falls within the domain of Practical antisemitism, thus confirming what had been hypothesized for the map of experiential categories.
Sanction against Jewish Rituals and Discrimination against Jews
One further dimension of antisemitism perceptions relates to the concerns expressed by Jews in Europe regarding instances of possible (cognitive) and actual (experiential) discrimination suffered.
Cognitive Level
The cognitive aspect was explored through a question about attitudes to possible government sanction against two significant Jewish rituals: circumcision of Jewish male infants (brit milah) and ritual slaughter of animals (shechitah). The original survey question [F10] was formulated as follows: In the last 12 months, have you personally heard or seen non-Jewish people suggest that circumcision and traditional slaughter (shechitah) should NOT be allowed to take place in your country? The possible answers were: yes to both, yes to one only, or no. Reference is to a cognitive perception that such issues were raised in public debate rather than to an experiential exposure of respondents to the issue. With regard to the countries included in the 2018 FRA study, however, such sanctions against the ritual slaughtering of animals have already been implemented in Sweden, Denmark, and Belgium, with severe regulation in several other countries (Feder 2019). Legislation to ban circumcision was suggested in different countries but was not implemented anywhere in the countries surveyed here (Triadafilopoulos 2019). In general, government or other public opposition to protection of two significant Jewish rituals can be interpreted as a potential sanction against widely held Jewish tenets, and by extension, against Jews as such.
With varying intensity across countries, the topic of European legislation possibly curtailing free access to traditional options among Jewish communities was at the center of much attention and public debate in recent years. The percentage of total respondents for whom the prohibition of circumcision would be a problem was 82%, versus 69% for traditional slaughter. It should be acknowledged that the frequencies of actual practice of any of the mentioned Jewish rituals – i.e. circumcising one’s own sons and consuming kosher meat – can be very different among any given Jewish population, and actual observance frequencies can be very different across the 12 EU countries investigated here. The relevance of the Jewish rituals mentioned here apparently involves the cognitive and emotional perceptions of Jewish individuals more than their behavioral sphere.
Overall, 9% of Jews in the 12 EU countries heard about the prohibition of circumcision, 11% about prohibition of ritual slaughtering, and 38% about both, for a total of 58%. Hence 42% had not heard about either. The pertinent Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) is reported in Figure 13. In the emerging map based on two categories (articulated in three partly overlapping options), the answers appear to be plotted in a circular-radial pattern. The total space is divided primarily between a domain of negative and a domain of positive answers. The positive answers domain is further partitioned between having heard about both issues, or about one issue only. Logically, the domain pertaining to the answer both represents the overlap of the two domains pertaining to either circumcision or ritual slaughter, and it therefore occupies an intermediate position between the two.
Figure 13. SSA of perceptions of public sanction against brit milah and shechitah, modulated by countries.
Experiential level
The experiential level of actual discrimination suffered by Jewish respondents is explored through perceptions regarding four different possible manifestations related to their personal characteristics. The original survey question [F01] was: In the PAST 12 MONTHS have you personally felt discriminated against in your country for any of the following reasons: Skin color; Ethnic origin or immigrant background; Religion or belief; Age; Sex/Gender; Disability; Sexual orientation; Gender identity; For another reason. Multiple responses possible. Here we focus on four aspects: gender, age, religion, and ethnicity. The percentage of respondents indicating one of the other grounds for discrimination was relatively low (5 % or less in the 12 EU Member States), and the number of respondents with relevant experiences was too small for country level analysis. Therefore, they were omitted from the present analysis (Figure 14, based on four categories).
Among Jewish respondents in 2018, 21% reported having felt personally discriminated on grounds of religion or belief, 13% because of age, 12% because of gender, and 11% because of ethnic origin or immigrant background. The selected options appear once again in a circular-radial pattern. Religion and ethnicity occupy relatively close positions, testifying to a closer connection between the two. Gender and age occupy more distant and apparently unrelated positions.
The partitions outlined in Figure 14 suggest two possible interpretations of the data. Perhaps the more obvious is that age and gender represent demographic categories, thus forming one domain, whereas religion and ethnicity both constitute socio-cultural categories directly related to the Jewish identity of respondents, and thus regroup in another domain. An alternative construct might be that gender, in this case women, as the two socio-cultural categories, pertains to a shared domain of (normative) minorities that in most contemporary societies still struggle to achieve full equality of rights and equity of treatment. Women actually constitute the majority of population in most developed countries, but in many respects their status is similar to that of a minority that still must go a long way before it will have achieved full parity with the societally hegemonic group – in this case, males. Both possible interpretations are outlined in Figure 14.
Figure 14. SSA of perceptions of discrimination suffered by Jews on selected grounds, modulated by countries.
Combined Levels
The combined configuration of feared sanction (cognitive) and suffered discrimination (experiential) appears in Figure 15, which results from the joint processing of the six categories displayed in Figure 13 and Figure 14.
The two original variables – the cognitive and the experiential – can be distinguished as separate domains divided by the dotted line in the map. More significantly, however, the combined categories form two recognizable domains, one pertaining to the life cycle (age and gender) and one to ethno-religious identities. Among the latter, two relate to actual discrimination on religious and ethnic grounds and two to feared sanction against circumcision and animal slaughtering. In particular, the categories of circumcision and religion appear in the same domain although they pertain to two different survey questions. The main finding here is the clear substantive connection between perceptions of antisemitism, despite their different cognitive or experiential nature.
Figure 15. SSA of combined perceptions of sanction against Jewish rituals and discrimination suffered, modulated by countries.
Perpetrators
Perceptions of antisemitic offenses go together with perceptions of who are the perpetrators of anti-Jewish harassment or violence. The 2018 FRA survey carried the following question [C06]: Who did this to you (items as listed)? Multiple responses possible. The categories of possible offenders were predetermined and included a variety of options ranging from ideological – political or religious – actors, to persons known through various kinds of social networks, to undetermined perpetrators. The findings, based on ten categories, appear in Figure 16.
The display on Figure 16 is axial, i.e., it reflects a categorical ordering of the variables involved. In the upper-right corner a strong perceptional proximity appears between Right-wing perpetrators (13% of respondents) and holders of Christian extremist views (5%). In the bottom-left corner there emerges some proximity between Left-wing (21%) and Muslim extremist perpetrators (30%). Quite logically, then, we find that the Right-wing/Christian domain stands at the opposite end of the map to the Left-wing/Islamic domain. It should be noted that following a specific FRA request, the categories mentioning the two religious backgrounds were confined to holders of extremist views, which may have significantly limited the reported frequency of these types of perpetrators.
In between, there appears a domain of perpetrators identified by various types of personal relationships or other personal characteristics (work or school/college colleague – 16%; a teenager or group of teenagers – 15%; an acquaintance or friend – 15%; a customer or client from work – 5%). Finally, a generic domain appears for others (someone else I cannot describe – 31%; someone else I can describe – 13%). Interestingly, the generic type domain is closer to the right-wing/Christian domain, while the identified type domain, namely, colleagues and acquaintances, is closer to the left-wing/Islamic domain. Whether this hints at the personal political opinions of respondents – closer to the Left than to the Right – cannot be determined here. The proximity between teenager and Muslim perpetrator also deserves attention.
It is worth recalling that the SSA spatial displays do not reflect the frequencies reported but rather the correlations between the various categories. It is noteworthy, however, that the cumulated percentages of perceived perpetrators (including multiple reporting) are as follows: Right/Christian – 18%; Left/Islamic – 51%; other specified – 51%; other unspecified – 48%). Wide variation characterizes the individual country distributions. I shall mention here merely that perpetrators with a Muslim extremist view were relatively the more numerous ones reported in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Perpetrators with a left-wing political view were the more frequent in Spain, Italy, and the UK. Perpetrators with a right-wing political view were the more frequent in Hungary and Poland.
Figure 16. SSA of perceptions of the perpetrator(s) in the most serious antisemitic incident of harassment in the five years before the survey, modulated by countries.
Multiple Reporting
One final synthetic look at the different variables reviewed so far is obtained by comparing the propensity to report multiple options to a single question – for those variables where multiple options were allowed. In such cases, the total frequency of reported categories was considerably above 100%. Multiple reporting can be interpreted as an indication of a perception of greater diffusion of antisemitism across the spectrum of options pertinent to each specific question. It can also be interpreted as an indication of greater sensitivity to antisemitism by respondents, some of whom would report each minimal sign of the phenomenon, while others would focus only on the more powerful and worrying perceptions. Figure 17 describes the variation across countries of the tendency to report multiple options for each of the seven variables examined (sanction of Jewish rituals is not included because options were mutually exclusive with no multiple reporting).
Figure 17. SSA of patterns of multiple reporting concerning perceptions of antisemitism, modulated by countries.
What again immediately appears in this circular display is the perceptional difference between cognitive and experiential variables. Cognitive variables are characterized by a much greater tendency to multiple reporting than experiential variables. Within this main distinction, on the cognitive side, we note a strong correlation between multiple reporting of social issues of national concern and of transmission channels of antisemitism. Antisemitism perceptions, as expressed through selected predetermined opinions, appear in a different domain. On the experiential side, the dots indicating the two variables – antisemitic contents actually heard and their transmission channels – perfectly overlap so that only one dot appears on the map. Such nearly total correlation between patterns of multiple reporting concerning the contents and the transmission channels of antisemitic experiences provides a first indication of a singularly important finding: the tool becomes a proxy for the contents. I shall further elaborate on this finding later in this report. In the experiential part of the map, multiple reporting about perpetrators occupies a domain not too distant from antisemitic contents and its transmission channels, with a further domain for multiple reporting about discrimination suffered.
The Multiple Layers of Antisemitism
After reviewing individually each of the single ingredients of Jewish perceptions of antisemitism, in this section, I examine how the multiple layers of the phenomenology combine in determining a more complex picture.
Contents of Antisemitism and Transmission Channels
I look first at the combined perceptional patterns of contents of antisemitism and their transmission channels, including both cognitive and experiential aspects (Figure 18, based on 31 categories). The first observation is that the perceptional separation between cognitive and experiential aspects, as already noted above, prevails upon the substantive distinction between antisemitism contents and transmission channels. The two perceptional spaces can be clearly separated (see dotted line) with one exception only: the experiential category of political speech is included within the area of cognitive categories. It appears coherently included in the political antisemitism domain together with other categories, all of them cognitive. The whole perceptional space is also clearly divided into four main domains, – Populist, Political, Practical, and Narrative – which already emerged in the preceding analysis of individual antisemitism ingredients.
Figure 18. SSA of combined cognitive and experiential perceptions of contents of antisemitism and transmission channels, modulated by countries.
- Variable in underlined italics address contents; variables in regular fonts address transmission channels.
Each of the four antisemitism domains includes both cognitive and experiential variables. Remarkably, the cognitive category Internet (including other social media) occupies the center of the whole configuration. Evidently, this recently emerged and now dominant transmission channel has become totally identified with the subject matter it transmits. Proceeding through the different domains in clockwise direction from the upper right corner (Populist antisemitism), most of the concepts classified under the conventional Protocols-style antisemitism show up in this domain: alleged characteristics of the Jews as a foreign, selfish, predatory, and polluting element of society, to be avoided, marginalized, and, if possible, destroyed. Remarkably, Holocaust denial and minimization has become fully incorporated within these older negative stereotypes. Perceptions of Populist antisemitism contents are fully integrated within and not distinguishable from the perceptions of transmission channels. The latter involve in spontaneous ways the social and public space and sports events. As noted, prominently represented here are personal expressions of hatred and hostility through the internet, the social media, and their straightforward ancestor – the mural graffiti.
The Political antisemitism domain, too, draws from both cognitive and experiential variables. One such variable, experiential political events, actually appears out of range, marked by a circle midway between Populist and Narrative domains. On the other hand, the Political domain also hosts the caption: Jews are not country nationals – on the political side of classic antisemitism.
The Practical antisemitism domain, along with the already noted cognitive perceptions of vandalism against Jewish cemeteries and institutions and other street manifestations, includes the classic antisemitic notion of Jews as physically recognizable. It also includes the more recently emerging phenomenon of an Israel boycott. Because of their physical practical connotations, both categories remarkably fit the respective domain. The Boycott Israel’s position is particularly interesting: the map shows its unequivocal perception by European Jews as a mode of practical antisemitism.
Finally, the Narrative antisemitism domain, along with the more sophisticated transmission channels of the Media other than internet, Cultural events, and Academia, clearly focuses on anti-Israeli contents: at the cognitive level it is Criticize Israel; at the experiential level – Israelis [are] Nazis, and The world would be better without Israel. The Media variable is represented here in both versions, cognitive and experiential, pointing again to the perceptional coherence between the two. The perceptional proximity of Academia with anti-Israel attitudes is a finding that cannot be ignored and requires further elaboration. The right to criticize Israel without being accused of antisemitism has been indeed a dominant leitmotif over recent decades, especially among the more educated sectors of society. The turning point obviously was the 1967 June war. Short of further interpretations, it is important to take notice that this is what European Jews feel and communicate through the web of category correlations unveiled by the SSA analysis.
Social Issues, Sanction, and Discrimination
I look next at the combined patterns of perceptions of national Social issues, Feared sanction (circumcision and slaughtering of animals), and Discrimination suffered, all inclusive of cognitive and experiential aspects (Figure 19, based on 13 categories). The map emerging here seems more complex and less straightforward than the previous one, but it provides several useful and also unexpected insights. Keep in mind that both Social issues and Feared sanctions are cognitive variables, whereas Discrimination suffered is experiential. In Figure 19, the domains pertaining to each survey question are separated by dotted lines, whereas the emerging contents domains are separated by the continuous lines. In the cognitive sphere, Social issue categories are indicated by triangle markers, and Feared sanction categories are marked by black dots.
Figure 19. SSA of combined cognitive and experiential perceptions of social issues, feared sanction and discrimination suffered, modulated by countries
In the bottom left corner of the map, the Ethnoreligious categories coalesce into one coherent domain, regardless of the different perceptional modes: Fear of sanction against circumcision and animal slaughtering, along with Discrimination suffered on grounds of Religion or Ethnic origin. The other categories of experienced discrimination – Age and Gender – both show up in a diagonal band forming a distinct Lifecycle domain. In turn, national social issues are spread across several domains, as already noted above in Figure 6. In the upper right corner, Crime and Unemployment form a Socio-economic domain, followed in axial sequence by a Political domain (Government corruption). Antisemitism stands at the center of an Ethno-cultural domain also inclusive of Racism and, in this case, of Immigration.
One intriguing aspect concerns the position on the map of Intolerance toward Muslims (marked by a dotted circle), a social issue that stands quite remote from Immigration and all other social issues and very close to the Feared sanction/cognitive/Ethnoreligious domain. One possible interpretation is that European Jews do perceive the problematic position of Muslims as a possibly sanctioned and discriminated minority. Jews may thus feel some possibly latent sense of affinity between their own position and that of Muslims in Europe. On the other hand, the interpretation might be oriented in a totally different direction: the proximity of Muslims with Jewish feared sanction and suffered discrimination might be a sign of a latent perception of Muslims constituting a menace to the position of Jews in society as people enjoying full equality and civil rights. If true, this would attribute to Muslims a dual role – among those who suffer intolerance by the majority of society but also among those who constitute a menacing source of intolerance against Jews. To appreciate which version may be closer to reality, we need to turn our attention to the nature of perpetrators of antisemitic acts.
One final thought again relates to the position on the map of the Feared discrimination domain. In the preceding description of variables, this one was attributed to the cognitive sphere. It may well be, however, that the highly emotional nature of the debate about the issue of circumcision implies that this domain pertains more to affective than to cognitive perceptions. This may indicate that if enough questions about the affective/emotional realm had been asked, the relevant categories would have found an independent place in the overall antisemitism perceptional space.
The Perceived Position of Perpetrators
I shall now examine how the perception of perpetrators integrates with the various perceptions of antisemitism examined so far. This is obtained by processing perpetrators perception data simultaneously with other relevant variables and condensing the findings in appropriate SSA maps.
Contents of Antisemitism and Transmission Channels
I look first at the combined cognitive and experiential perceptions of contents of antisemitism and transmission channels, jointly with perpetrators (Figure 20). With the additional input of perpetrators’ categories, Figure 20, based on 38 categories, reproduces very faithfully Figure 18, with the exception of [2] Media, which appears now to be transferred from the Narrative antisemitism to the Practical antisemitism domain.
In the map, Perpetrator categories – classified as experiential perceptions – appear as yellow triangle markers, cognitive antisemitism (contents and transmission channels together) as blue dots, and experiential antisemitism (contents and transmission together) as yellow dots. With only very modest positional changes, the main partition between cognitive and experiential variables confirms my previous observations. The cognitive variables are regrouped mainly in the central parts of the configuration, with only a few outliers, namely: [21] Would not marry a Jew and [18] Jews not country nationals. Again, the cognitive perception of Internet including other social media, as the consensually agreed leading conveyor of antisemitism, occupies the center of the entire configuration.
Perpetrator categories appear on the map as an elliptic, external pattern running all around the other variables, and intersecting through the four main classification domains of Jewish antisemitism perceptions: the Populist, the Political, the Practical, and the Narrative. A clear division of labor appears in the first place between the Right-and-Christian and the Left-and-Islamic types. The former are strongly associated with the Populist antisemitism domain, characterized by instinctive, improvised, conventional anti-Jewish prejudice. The latter are strongly associated with the Narrative antisemitism domain, characterized by cultivated, thoughtful, anti-Israel prejudice. Other types of perpetrators stand in between. The colleague and acquaintance perpetrator types appear in between Populist and Narrative antisemitism domains; the teenager but also the customer perpetrator types appear in the Practical antisemitism domain. Here it becomes more apparent how the Political antisemitism domain is much closer to the Right/Christian than to the Left/Islamic perpetrator types.
Figure 20. SSA of combined cognitive and experiential perceptions of contents of antisemitism and transmission channels, with perpetrators, modulated by countries.
Social issues, Sanction, and Discrimination
I turn now to the combined cognitive and experiential perceptions of national social issues, feared sanction, and discrimination suffered, jointly with perpetrators (Figure 21). Figure 21, based on 21 categories, reproduces with some adaptations the contents of Figure 19, with the additional input of perpetrators’ categories. As in the previous Figure 20, perpetrator categories appear on the map as an elliptic, external pattern running all around the other variables.
The different topics outlined in Figure 21 – see the diagonal dotted lines – appear again as distinct domains, once again outlining the separation between cognitive and experiential variables. Several substantive domains comprise the different categories: Socioeconomic, including Crime and Unemployment; Political, including Government corruption; Ethno-cultural, including Antisemitism, Racism and Immigration; Lifecycle, including Age and Gender; and Ethno-religious, including a combination of feared sanction against Jewish rituals (circumcision and slaughtering), Discrimination suffered (on religious and ethnic background), and concern for intolerance against Muslims. The latter again appears significantly out of its natural context among other national social issues covered in the FRA study. At the center of the whole configuration stands Antisemitism as a cognitive social issue of concern.
Figure 21. SSA of combined cognitive and experiential perceptions of social issues, feared sanction and discrimination suffered, with perpetrators, modulated by countries.
The findings emerging here are of capital importance: among a large representative sample of European Jews, the cognitive aspects of antisemitism – more than anything else – constitute an organizing origin and central principle of all other perceptional aspects.
The position of perpetrators on this map reveals other important underlying principles of antisemitism perceptions. In Jewish perceptions, Right-wing and Christian perpetrators strongly correlate with racism and intolerance versus Muslims. Left-wing and Islamic perpetrators tend to be perceived more in the association with general social issues, such as crime, unemployment, and immigration. Concern with immigration, in turn, is associated with Muslims as antisemitism perpetrators. The complex dual role of Muslims in Jewish perceptions re-emerges here patently: Muslims are seen simultaneously as victims of societal discrimination and as perpetrators of anti-Jewish offenses. The correspondence between Teenager and Muslim perpetrators now becomes clearer. It also points to an affinity with the already described composite domain of feared sanction against Jewish rituals (cognitive) and discrimination of Jews on religio-ethnic grounds (experiential). The possibility that Feared sanction about circumcision and ritual slaughtering actually pertains to an affective/emotional rather than cognitive realm is confirmed here.
The Whole Picture
The final more complex and multiple-variable picture in the present analysis is obtained by superimposing all the perceptional layers examined so far: contents of antisemitism, transmission channels, societal issues, feared sanction, discrimination suffered, and perpetrators (Figure 22, based on 52 categories). Reading of the map is not the easiest because of the many and diverse variables included. The need to accommodate so many factors within one synthetic map may cause the shifting of some variables from the position already noted in previous maps to different positions, reflecting the more numerous and complex interrelations with all other variables examined. To render the reading easier, a legend reports the full list of variables, their detailed respective categories, their numbering on the map, and the respective different recognizable markers.
The fundamental findings have already been established from the previous analysis. In the first place the distinction between cognitive and experiential variables determines a clear-cut division with only one evident outlier: [21] Would not marry a Jew – a cognitive-attitudinal questions positioned within the experiential-behavioral main domain.
Within this basic distinction, the four-fold main antisemitism typology hypothesized and largely confirmed by the foregoing analysis appears as an important organizing principle within the gamut of antisemitism perceptions. At the center of the whole configuration, two categories constitute the origin, synthesis, and main focal point actually shared by all four antisemitism domains. This dual central point includes: [40] Antisemitism – a cognitive variable – entering this map as the prime national social issue of concern; and [11] Internet including social media – also a cognitive variable – entering as the prime transmission channel. The focus of antisemitism perceptions on the cognitive more than on the experiential sphere is the crucial qualifier of the whole syndrome investigated here. The two variables of contents and transmission produce a powerful synergy through the two categories Antisemitism as the prime perceived national issue and the Internet as its prime perceived diffusor.
The combination of so many aspects of antisemitism perceptions reported in Figure 22 reveals several other more or less intimate connections and affinities between topics that usually are discussed separately. One aspect, already noted above, is the domain coherence between features observed both at the cognitive and the experiential level. This is the case with the Internet including social media, perceived as a central transmission channel [11] and as an actual conveyor of antisemitic hatred [1]. Both pertain to the Populist antisemitism domain. In turn, the Media other than the Internet, perceived as a potential [13] and actual [3] vehicle, both fall in the Narrative antisemitism domain. The configuration of all other markers of antisemitism contents and transmission channels within main domains is approximately the same as already seen above in Figure 18 and Figure 20.
Figure 22. SSA of combined cognitive and experiential perceptions of contents of antisemitism, transmission channels, social issues, feared sanction and discrimination suffered, with perpetrators, modulated by countries.
It is interesting to assess how and where variables related to feared sanction, discrimination suffered, and social issues appear within this grid of domains. Discrimination suffered on various grounds [49, 50, 51, 52] appears in the Populist domain. Sanction feared against Circumcision [47] appears – quite logically – in the Practical domain, whereas sanction against Animal slaughtering quite appropriately appears in the political domain. With regard to social issues of national concern, Crime level [42] and Unemployment [43] enter into the Practical domain, Immigration [44] into the Narrative domain, Racism [41] into the Political domain, and Government corruption [46] into the Populist domain. The latter domain also hosts Intolerance against Muslims [45].
Perpetrators are now more clearly split between the Populist domain (Christian extremist [33], Right-wing [35], and Colleague [37]), and the Narrative domain (Muslim extremist [32], Left-wing [34], acquaintance [36], customer [38], and teenager [39]).
Summing up, the perceptions of antisemitism contents and transmission channels in this comprehensive analysis confirm the main patterns already seen in greater detail. Classic antisemitic stereotypes touching upon alleged negative characteristics of Jews and Holocaust denial are rooted together with the improvised expressions of the Social media, Graffiti, Public space, and Sports events within the Populist antisemitism domain. Negative and demonizing expressions about Israel are rooted together with the learned and polished tools of the Media, Academia, and Culture within the Narrative antisemitism domain. The dual perception of Muslims is again worth noting: as victims of intolerance associated with perceptions of Right-wing and Christian perpetrators and as perpetrators associated with perceptions of Left-wing peers.
Sergio Della Pergola, demografo
(continua)
(da Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look. Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism. Berlin: De Gruyter, and Jerusalem: SICSA, ACTA, 40, 2, 2020)