Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look. 1
Introduction
According to the second study of experiences and perceptions of antisemitism undertaken by the Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union – FRA – among Jews in 12 EU countries, in 2018, a large majority of respondents (85 %) considered antisemitism and racism to be the most pressing problem among a list of items submitted for evaluation across the EU member states surveyed (FRA 2018a). A large majority of respondents (89 %) believed that antisemitism had increased over the past five years in their country of residence. Most survey respondents said they were regularly exposed to negative statements about Jews. A large majority of respondents across all surveyed countries (80 %) identified the internet as the most common forum for negative statements about Jews. These findings, to say the least, are a matter of concern not only to Jews in Europe but also to the European Union itself, which initiated the investigation, hoping to derive useful information and feasible policy recommendations. Antisemitism, according to the 2018 survey findings, has become again a European problem, despite the Jews’ infinitesimal proportion of the EU’s total population, assessed at slightly above 2 per 1000 inhabitants in 2018 (DellaPergola 2019).
In global perspective – at least according to a world enquiry undertaken by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL 2014) – the frequency of contemporary antisemitic prejudice was on average lower in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe; a much lower incidence appeared in transoceanic English speaking countries; in Latin America, the incidence was intermediate between Western and Eastern Europe; and a much higher incidence prevailed in Islamic civilization areas. Countries in Southeast Asia usually displayed very low levels of antisemitic prejudice, especially where the impact of Christian and Islamic civilizations was marginal. Some of the antisemitic ideologies were originally developed in a mostly Christian Europe, some in the older civilization areas of the Middle East, and some elsewhere. Particularly noteworthy was the growing speed and intensity of import, export, and circulation of antisemitic ideas, and the translation of prejudice into organized social and political movements in an increasingly globalized world.
Although the world has witnessed the wide geographical spread of antisemitism, unlike in the past, most contemporary Jews currently live in cultural areas characterized by relatively low intensities of antisemitism. These also are the more highly developed and democratic areas of the world (DellaPergola 2018). The more relevant basis for observing antisemitism and its perceptions has tended, therefore, to become less the local episode of discrimination or aggression and more the broader perception and diffusion of the fundamental themes at stake. Today, beyond local salience, perceptions of antisemitism simultaneously reach and affect all or the vast majority of those who perceive themselves as Jews and in one way or another feel part of a symbolic, cultural, or otherwise global Jewish collective. Antisemitism has increasingly come to be perceived as an insidious transnational phenomenon, not necessarily related to direct contact with Jews as real-life individuals but largely touching upon collective and geographically diffused sensitivities. The resonance and impact of antisemitic discourse and its perceptions by Jews have been enormously magnified by the communication networks inherent in globalization and transnational processes.
Beyond these descriptive observations about the contemporary scene, the nature of antisemitism and its perception in society and of its perceptions by Jews remains somewhat elusive. What is the ultimate trope of antisemitism? Does it feature a recognizable conceptual articulation and structure? Does a particular statement, episode, or sequence of actions constitute antisemitism? Is antisemitism universal or local, timeless or conjunctural, fixed or mutant? What are its main channels of transmission? Who are the perpetrators, and why and how do they operate? Is there a measurable relationship between the amount of antisemitism in society and its perception among Jewish communities? What is its perceived subjective meaning among those exposed to it? What is the effect of antisemitism on its targets? And why do two contemporaneous sources provide such disparate accounts: one contends that antisemitism is increasing, whereas the other says it is not (Staetsky 2019b).
A large library of diversely oriented analyses is devoted to documenting antisemitism and trying to provide answers to some of these questions (e.g., Adorno et al. 1950; Almog 1988; Bauer 1988; Brown 1994; Cotler 2009; Ettinger 1978; Gerstenfeld 2005; Glock and Stark 1966; Lewis 1999; Lipstadt 2019; Marcus 2015; Michman 2014; Nirenberg 2013; Paxton 2004, Poliakov 2003; Rosenfeld 2019; Wistrich 2010). Numerous works have undertaken an analysis of antisemitism in a given national context (e.g., Baum et al. 2016; Ben Rafael 2014; Bokser Liwerant and Siman 2016; DellaPergola 2015; Gudkov and Levinson 1992, Kovács 2014; Küntzel 2013; Rudling 2006; Wieviorka 2005). At a broader level of conceptualization, syntheses of the literature and typologies of the antisemitic syndrome are available (e.g., Bauer 2002; Michman 2003; Jikeli 2015). There also are polemic and militant advocacy pamphlets (e.g., Jewish Voice for Peace 2017, UN Watch 2018), along with systematic classifications of the types of data extant or needed to measure antisemitism (e.g., ISGAP 2018; Popper 2018). The majority of this literature has addressed the phenomenon from the viewpoint of the hegemonic society and of its consequences for the Jewish minorities living there.
Despite this impressive body of knowledge and analysis, and as surprising as it may seem, the state of the art in the study of antisemitism and of its perceptions is still unsatisfactory – especially with regard to its theoretical conceptualization (Judaken 2018). Significantly, the perceptions of antisemitism by Jews – the target – have been relatively less investigated. This study deals with Jewish perceptions of antisemitism in Europe from an empirical social scientific perspective. Some initial effort is thus needed to define and assess the complex of ideas, behaviors, and institutions external to the Jews – labeled in first approximation as antisemitism. Moreover, it is important to operationalize and measure the perceptions of antisemitism from the interior of the target population.
Beginning with a rough generalization, antisemitism may be perceived as an outlook aimed at achieving one or more of three main goals:
–Physical violence and annihilation of the Jew;
–Marginalization and exclusion of the Jew from civil, social, economic, and cultural life;
–Worsening of the Jew’s private quality of life by arousing fear, frustration, and anxiety.
Whereas in long-term historical experience, the first two goals were achieved with some degree of success, in contemporary practice, the third goal probably seems more relevant. In such an elementary characterization, the boundary between the Jew as an individual and the Jews as a collective is often not easy to detect. This may importantly affect Jewish perceptions of antisemitism that simultaneously pertain to self and to others related to the self by some religious, ethnic, symbolic, cultural, or other types of bonds.
A more comprehensive working definition of antisemitism was elaborated and made available by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC 2004; see also Porat 2018). Building on those premises, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA 2016) subsequently issued the following, in its own terms, non-legally binding and actually rather bland working definition: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews that may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions, and religious facilities”.
The explanatory text that followed this definition was much more incisive and explicit and specified eleven modalities of behaviors and attitudes embodying antisemitism. Two of these referred to attributing excessive power to Jews; two referred to denial or minimization of the Holocaust; six referred to delegitimization of the State of Israel, and one directly addressed the desire to annihilate the Jews. This simple typology did not emerge from a vacuum but rather represented the product of an effort to synthetize the major features of antisemitism as they developed over time and can be detected today.
The many relevant research efforts deployed in this respect analyzed the issues mainly from the historical and literary angles. Less evident or, at least, less central, an empirical social scientific perspective largely drew on the other disciplinary perspectives to create its own conceptualization of antisemitism. Empirical social research can claim to have one modest advantage over other disciplinary approaches: it must abide by transparent and pre-established criteria of plausibility and repeatability, also known as significance tests. If these criteria are not met, the results lack validity, which should disqualify their circulation. Self-imposed rigor may limit the scope and imagination of investigation, but these constraints are compensated for by a supposed premium on reliability and objectivity.
From an empirical social scientific perspective, fundamental axes of research on antisemitism should always – but often do not – include a minimum core of essential elements:
–The nature and frequency of antisemitic events;
–The conceptual contents of offenses;
–The place of antisemitism as a component of Jewish identity;
–The ideological background of perpetrators;
–The geographical, demographic, and socioeconomic correlates of the offenders and of the offended;
–The depth of damage caused by an offense;
–The emotional reaction by the offended;
–The transmission channels of offense;
–The cumulated influence (total number of persons exposed to) offense;
–The Jewish response to offense;
–The general response and efficiency of sanctions applied against offenses and offenders.
Research undertaken in recent years actually provided some valuable notions about the specific contents, channels of dissemination, and perpetrators of antisemitic ideas and actions, and of their perceptions among the Jewish public. I would argue, however, that over time, the more theoretical approaches to antisemitism have become part of a broader kulturkampf in which personal, ideological, and political narratives often played a prominent role in research agendas, methodologies, and interpretative strategies.
A foundational turning point in Jewish history occurred after the establishment of the State of Israel and the transition of Jews from minority status among other nations to political sovereignty. Israel’s independence created a novel opportunity for the expression of anti-Jewish attitudes and actions by those who opposed such a development on grounds related both to the international political context and to the very fact that the operating actors were Jews. It also created the need to reflect on the State of Israel’s presence on the regional and global scene as an autonomous factor and on the nature of its actions. Israel’s existence significantly affected Jewish identities, behaviors, and experiences. For a variety of demographic, social, and cultural reasons, it became increasingly difficult to disentangle practically and analytically the development and fate of the Jewish Diaspora from that of the State of Israel. Concern for Israel became a new facet in the clustered paradigm of perceived Jewish identification, but Israel also became a new target of anti-Jewish hostility, in part interrelated with other pre-existing forms of prejudice. The issue of the relationship between anti-Zionism and antisemitism became one of the dominant aspects of the current debate about antisemitism and its perceptions, sometimes obscuring other no less important aspects.
The present study deals with how perceptions of antisemitism are articulated among Jews in the European Union. As part of the effort to improve research on Jewish perceptions of antisemitism, this paper tries to bridge between the predominant historiographic approach and a quantitative methodology. Ideally, a multidisciplinary approach should be adopted in the study of antisemitism. One needs to integrate new and different state-of-the-art analytic perspectives through the use of sophisticated tools now available for archive scanning, retrieving, and storing documentation, data processing, textual analysis, evaluation of artistic performances, and multi-cultural contextualization (e.g., Jickeli and Allouche-Benayoun 2013; Shainkman 2018; Lindert and Marsoobian 2018; Weisz 2018). To describe and unveil both the immediately evident and the latent conceptual dimensions of contemporary antisemitism and its perceptions requires in-depth analysis of evidence and of its implications, comparisons across different geocultural contexts, original utilization and improvement of available analytic tools.
Diachronically and spatially, several measurable aspects of antisemitism displayed contrasting levels and trends, ranging between higher and lower frequencies, and between stable or mutable patterns, thus evoking contradictory interpretations and conclusions. Resolving these contradictions requires careful reflection and the application of deep theoretical and methodological elaboration to clarify the immediately perceptible descriptive elements. This hopefully will be demonstrated in the following pages.
Sergio Della Pergola, demografo
(continua)
(da Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look. Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism. Berlin: De Gruyter, and Jerusalem: SICSA, ACTA, 40, 2, 2020)